Description

In this chapter I will offer objections against the metaphysics of Humean Supervenience, according to which our world consists in a plurality of selfcontained objects standing in external relations. Its aim is to raise suspicions against these two basic constituents and justify the initial plausibility of the holistic alternatives that will be assessed later. In 1.1 I discuss the central elements of Humean Supervenience and similar ontologies. In 1.2 I explain the contemporary dichotomies of internal/external relations and intrinsic/extrinsic properties, central to the claim of independence or separability embraced by Humean Supervenience. In 1.3 I give a hint about the historical origin of external relations-something that will be explored with more detail in ch. 2-and raise initial doubts against the fragmented worldview that they entail. In 1.4 I raise some metaphysical difficulties with external relations. In 1.5 I do the same with self-contained objects. In 1.6 I present the ultimate empirical challenge against the fragmented worldview. Finally, in 1.7, I give a synopsis of what follows.